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Abstract—For a number of years, many websites have used
CAPTCHAs to filter out interactions by bots. However, attackers
have found ways to circumvent CAPTCHAs by programming
bots to solve or bypass them, or even relay them for humans to
solve. In order to reduce the chances of success of such attacks,
CAPTCHAs can be strengthened by the addition of certain
safeguards. In this paper, we discuss seven existing safeguards
as well as five novel safeguards designed to make circumventing
CAPTCHAs harder. These safeguards are not mutually exclusive
and can add multiple layers of protection to a CAPTCHA. We
further provide a high-level comparison of their effectiveness in
addressing the threat posed by CAPTCHA-defeating techniques.
In order to focus on safeguards that are usable, we restrict our
attention to those which have minimal adverse effect on the user
experience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost 20 years, Completely Automated Public Turing
tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs), also
known as Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs), have been used
by website owners to filter out interactions from computer
programs known as bots [2], [25]. CAPTCHA puzzles, or tests,
may take many forms, but the most commonly used involve
asking the user to type in an obscured text that is intended to
be difficult for bots to recognize.
The type of bots that are routinely deployed against
CAPTCHAs perform tasks that are unwanted by website
owners. For example, a bot might be developed to create a
large number of email accounts at a free email provider, e.g.
for subsequent use in sending spam emails [27]. An attacker
could manually create such accounts; however, they will be
less productive than a bot, exemplified by the fact that we tried
several publicly available bots and found that it takes less than
a second for such a bot to fill out a typical registration form.
Bots are widely used to perform repetitive tasks automatically
and at a much higher rate than would be possible for humans
[26]. Therefore, even when stopping bots completely is not
possible, it would be helpful to have means of slowing them
down so that the damage they can cause is reduced.
In recent years, the apparent effectiveness of methods for
defeating existing CAPTCHAs has given rise to a large and
growing literature on novel CAPTCHA techniques (see, for
example, [16], [27]). By contrast, in this paper we focus on
techniques that could stop, or at least slow down, bots by
increasing the effectiveness of existing CAPTCHAs. Several
of these techniques could be useful in preventing bot traffic
even if conventional CAPTCHAs are not used. Other authors,
notably Moradi and Keyvanpour [15], have looked at subsets
of these safeguards, but in more restrictive contexts; in the case
of Moradi and Keyvanpour they examined safeguards which
can be regarded as alternatives to CAPTCHAs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We
start in sections II and VII-A with background information
on CAPTCHAs and the known attacks on them. In section
IV we discuss, at a high level, tactics that could be used to
improve the security of CAPTCHAs, followed by descriptions
of existing and novel CAPTCHA safeguards in sections V and
VI. The safeguards are reviewed and analysed in section VII.
In sections VIII and IX, we discuss potential future work and
give concluding remarks.
II. CAPTCHAS
CAPTCHAs are typically used by websites as an automated
way of blocking interactions initiated by computer programs
commonly known as bots. These bots are used to automatically
accomplish undesirable tasks such as: creating a large number
of accounts (e.g. email accounts to be used for malicious
purposes such as originating spam), manipulating online polls
and creating large volumes of traffic to a website to cause a
Denial of Service (DoS) [25].
Many commonly visited websites1 use CAPTCHAs, in-
cluding YouTube, MSN, Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Twitter.
However, CAPTCHAs suffer from two main practical prob-
lems. One is that in many cases it has been shown to be
possible to program bots to solve a specific CAPTCHA. The
other is that, in practice, humans often find it challenging to
solve CAPTCHAs [17].
Existing CAPTCHAs, regardless of their type, often test
one or more of the following human capabilities that are
believed to be very challenging for computers to reproduce.
In particular, most tests rely on the human ability to:
• recognize previously unseen variations of a known
object, image or text,
• segment and recognize connected or overlapping char-
acters and/or objects,
• detect anomalies through innate understanding of what
is out of context [22].
III. KNOWN ATTACKS ON CAPTCHAS
Many means of circumventing the protection provided by
CAPTCHAs have been devised [17], although they typically
fall into one of three categories. The first involves devising
1The CAPTCHA Usage website http://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/captcha
provides continuously updated information about the current use of
CAPTCHAs.
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methods to automatically, and quickly, solve a particular class
of CAPTCHAs, i.e. devising efficient software techniques for
solving the problem underlying the CAPTCHA. The second
involves bypassing the CAPTCHA completely, i.e. without
solving the puzzle, typically as a result of an insecure im-
plementation. The third is to make humans solve CAPTCHA
puzzles on behalf of bots. We next briefly enlarge a little on
each of these attack categories.
1) CAPTCHA-solving attacks: Such an attack involves
breaking a CAPTCHA by devising an algorithm to automati-
cally solve the puzzle that is assumed to be unsolvable by bots.
Since most CAPTCHAs in use are visual puzzles [27], such an
attack often uses computer vision techniques [24]. This means
that the bot is able to read, or recognize, the puzzle that was
wrongly assumed not to be automatically solvable.
2) CAPTCHA-bypass attacks: Attacks of this type involve
a bot being able to bypass a CAPTCHA puzzle rather than
solve it. Such attacks typically rely on compromising a vul-
nerable implementation of a CAPTCHA, in which the server
is fooled into thinking the CAPTCHA has been solved when
in reality it is has been bypassed [1].
3) Human exploitation attacks: In this category of attack,
humans are knowingly, or unknowingly, induced to solve
CAPTCHA puzzles on behalf of a bot; the human-provided
solutions to the puzzles are by some means passed to the bot
prior to being submitted to the website [24]. If the humans are
doing so knowingly, they are typically given an incentive [7].
Alternatively, a human might unknowingly solve a CAPTCHA
for a bot if a CAPTCHA puzzle of one website is displayed
on another [19].
IV. IMPROVING CAPTCHA SECURITY
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss safeguards that
can help stop or slow down bots. It is important to note
here that none of the safeguards should be considered as a
foolproof defence against bots. They mainly serve the purpose
of reducing the chances of a bot circumventing a CAPTCHA,
as well as protecting against bots that are programmed to break
specific types of CAPTCHAs, e.g. text-based schemes.
We restrict our attention to safeguards that have a minimal
effect on usability, since user acceptability is key to the success
of such schemes. That is, any safeguard that would require
users to perform extra steps other than solving the CAPTCHA
is not considered in this paper. It is also important to note that
CAPTCHAs could be implemented by a website owner or,
alternatively, could be provided by a third-party CAPTCHA
provider. For simplicity, in the remainder of this paper we
assume that the CAPTCHA is provided by a third party
provider, as is commonly the case.
We next describe a range of possible safeguards, first those
previously proposed or implemented, and then a selection of
techniques we believe to be novel. As noted above, these
safeguards can be combined to create extra layers of security
for a CAPTCHA.
V. EXISTING CAPTCHA SAFEGUARDS
In this section, we discuss seven previously proposed
CAPTCHA safeguards, namely: IP blacklisting, site keys,
decoy fields, time monitoring, framing prevention, interaction
detection, and pointer movement accuracy. Two of these safe-
guards (described in V-C and V-D) have also been briefly
discussed in [15].
A. IP Blacklisting
In order to protect CAPTCHAs against attack attempts
from a single or a small number of IP address(es), website
owners can record the IP addresses of computers interacting
with their website. Accordingly, if increased traffic from spe-
cific IP(s) is observed attempting to solve the CAPTCHA or
access the website resources protected by CAPTCHA, then it
could indicate that the source of interaction is a bot (this relates
to a more sophisticated solution proposed by Kandula et al.
[12]). IP blacklisting, i.e. blocking interactions arising from
particularly active sites, has shown good potential in reducing
spam generated by bots [19].
This method needs to be used with caution since IP
addresses are sometimes shared by several computers, e.g.
when a proxy server is in use, or the IP addresses could
belong to temporarily compromised computers. One alterna-
tive to blacklisting, which would lessen the impact on those
clients falsely classified as bots, would be to increase the
number or difficulty of CAPTCHA puzzles sent to such clients.
Nonetheless, since IP addresses of clients can be dynamic, it
is important to remove IP addresses from the blacklist after
a certain period of time. This will help reduce the chance of
blocking a client which happens to be assigned an IP address
that was used by an attacker in the past.
B. Site Keys
Some CAPTCHA providers create a site key (i.e. a unique
public key) for each website making use of their CAPTCHAs.
The key helps bind the CAPTCHA to its corresponding
domain. This key is typically included in the web page’s
source code. For example, from some simple tests on re-
CAPTCHA, we discovered that the provider offers an optional
feature called Domain Name Validation, which apparently uses
JavaScript to check that, when loading the page that contains
the CAPTCHA, the site key used corresponds to the website
it is being loaded by. This is intended to prevent a CAPTCHA
that is being used to control access to one domain from being
displayed by another domain.
We tested the reuse of site keys on several widely used
CAPTCHAs2, including reCAPTCHA, sweetCaptcha and Key
CAPTCHA, by using the site key on a domain we own. All of
them seem to use this safeguard as we were unable to display
CAPTCHAs originally appearing in a page for a different
domain. For example, in the case of reCAPTCHA, the page
displayed the error message Error site owner invalid domain
for site key instead of the CAPTCHA, as shown in figure 1.
The reCAPTCHA scheme appears to use a somewhat more
complex protection scheme. The reCAPTCHA website3 refers
to the use of a website-specific key pair made up of a secret
2The CAPTCHA Usage website http://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/captcha
provides continuously updated information about the current use of
CAPTCHAs.
3https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/start, as accessed on 31/8/16
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Fig. 1. No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA invalid domain error message
and the (public) site key. Quite how these keys are related
(for example, whether they make up a key pair for a digital
signature scheme) is not made clear; as a result, we do not
discuss the use of such key pairs further here. Another scheme
apparently using a pair of cryptographic keys to protect against
human exploitation attacks is described by Saklikar and Saha
[21], although it only appears to work within the context
of an anti-phishing protection scheme; again, because of its
specialised operation we do not consider it further here.
C. Decoy Fields
In 2007, a blogger proposed what he called the Honeypot
Captcha4 and this approach was subsequently discussed in
[15]. The concept is to add an extra dummy field to an online
form. This field is made invisible by using Cascading Style
Sheets (CSS) code, which hides it from users but not from bots.
The idea is to trick bots into filling out a decoy field which
will not be completed by a human. If the field is completed,
then the server knows it is interacting with a bot, and the form
can be rejected. Alternatively, the decoy field could be part of
the CAPTCHA puzzle instead of the form.
The technique was originally proposed as a replacement for
conventional CAPTCHAs requiring user interaction. However,
and like the other safeguards discussed in this paper, it seems
more appropriate to consider it as a way of complementing
CAPTCHAs rather than replacing them. To make life harder
for bot writers, website owners can create decoy fields using
a range of techniques, e.g. utilizing scripting languages.
D. Response Time Monitoring
Users will typically take longer to fill out an online form
than a bot. Indeed, if bots only worked at the speed of humans,
then part of the reason for using them would disappear. This
observation motivates the operation of this safeguard, in which
the website measures how long it takes for a web form to be
completed and returned. It would also be helpful to measure
how quickly a user submits their input in order to detect
abnormally fast responses [3].
Such a test can be implemented using a simple JavaScript
timing event, and if the interaction is suspected to be from a
bot because of its speed then the submission can be ignored.
Of course, the precise timing criterion used to distinguish
between a bot and a human will need to depend on the
type of CAPTCHA and the other inputs required, and setting
this criterion correctly may need practical trials. Moreover, to
optimize the effectiveness of this safeguard it would be ideal
to start measuring the time taken only once interactions have
been detected rather than when the page, or CAPTCHA, is
downloaded. Such an approach will counteract bots that load
4 http://haacked.com/archive/2007/09/11/honeypot-captcha.aspx/
pages and then wait for a short period of time before inputting
the values.
It is also interesting to observe that using this safeguard will
either stop bots for being too quick or, alternatively, if a bot is
programmed to imitate human speed, it will negatively affect
one of the main objectives of using bots in the first place, i.e.
to save time [17]. Moreover, this safeguard would be a useful
mitigation for DoS attacks, as such attacks are often meant
to overwhelm a server with large volumes of traffic within a
short time frame [14].
E. Framing Prevention
Some human exploitation attacks are implemented by dis-
playing a victim website containing a CAPTCHA on a dif-
ferent website using an iframe tag or other framing technique
[6]. In this way, an attacker can take advantage of unsuspecting
users to solve CAPTCHAs on behalf of a bot. However, such
an attack can be mitigated by instructing the web browser not
to display a target website if it is embedded within another
website [11]. This can be implemented using HTTP header
tags such as x-iframe-options or Content Security Policy (CSP)
[20].
F. Interaction Detection
Many bots do not exhibit human-like interactions with web
pages [9]. This safeguard detects bots by detecting a lack of
interactions with a web page that are typical of a human user
[18]. Such interactions include: pointer movements, keystrokes
and form field focus (i.e. placing the cursor in a field) [9], [23].
This safeguard can be deployed on a full web page or restricted
to the CAPTCHA.
G. Pointer Movement Accuracy
Ideally, and unlike typical bots, users will not move a
pointer very accurately (e.g. they are unlikely to move the
pointer in perfectly straight lines) [8]. This safeguard detects
the accuracy of pointer movements to differentiate between a
bot and human interaction.
This safeguard can be deployed in a range of ways, includ-
ing downloading a script (e.g. in JavaScript) to the browser
that detects when the pointer passes over certain points in a
web page. Of course, how many pointer movements need to
be detected for the script to deem that a user is present will
depend on the particular web page and on the CAPTCHA, and
it is likely that some experimentation will be required to find
appropriate parameters.
It is possible that, when filling online forms, users might
not use the mouse/touchpad, as they could instead use their
keyboards and the Tab key to move from one field to another.
As a result, this safeguard should ideally be restricted to
the CAPTCHA interface (i.e. not the full web page) given
that many widely used CAPTCHAs, including image-based
reCAPTCHA, SweetCaptcha and KeyCAPTCHA, necessitate
the use of a pointer.
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VI. NOVEL CAPTCHA SAFEGUARDS
In this section, we propose five new categories of safe-
guards that could be used to strengthen a CAPTCHA. To
the author’s knowledge, none of them have previously been
proposed, although we cannot rule the possibility that one or
more of them may already be in use by a CAPTCHA provider.
Moreover, at least in theory, all these safeguards can be used
together, as they address different aspects of detecting bot
interactions.
A. CAPTCHA Brand Customization
Several CAPTCHA providers, including reCAPTCHA5,
allow website owners to customize the look of a CAPTCHA.
It could be useful to take advantage of this feature so that
the CAPTCHA also displays the name and/or logo of the
website. To try to ensure that this information is acted upon, the
CAPTCHA could also be accompanied by a statement of the
form “Do not attempt to solve this CAPTCHA if the site name
below does not match the site you are visiting”. This might
help alert users that they are being used to solve a CAPTCHA
that belongs to a website other than the one they are visiting,
i.e. addressing human exploitation attacks (see section II). Of
course, providing such information would have no effect if
humans are intentionally solving CAPTCHAs for bots.
This is not a particularly robust safeguard since it depends
on users reading, understanding, and acting upon the informa-
tion provided. Nonetheless, if customization is enabled by the
CAPTCHA provider then this should be fairly straightforward
to implement.
B. Hotlink Prevention
Hotlinking (or inline linking) is the process of displaying
an object on a web page by linking to its source [13], and it
can be used as a means to perform a human exploitation attack
(see section II). Just like the site key safeguard described in
section V-B, hotlink prevention attempts to prevent the display
of a CAPTCHA, or its corresponding page, on a website other
than the one intended. However, hotlink prevention is more
straightforward to implement than the use of site key since
it only requires the addition of a simple piece of code. For
example, if an Apache server is in use, the safeguard could be
implemented simply by including an appropriately configured
.htaccess file. This web server configuration file can be used
to control access to server files or resources [4].
This safeguard is very commonly used to prevent hotlink-
ing of images for copyright reasons and/or bandwidth abuse
[13]. However, the same principle can be applied to other
objects (e.g. web pages, audio files, etc.) since in all cases it
will simply result in the web browser displaying an error page
instead of the hotlinked object. In the case of a CAPTCHA,
any media files it uses, or even a JavaScript file that could
be operating it, can be protected using such a safeguard.
Implementing such a safeguard would involve checking the
HTTP referrer field of the resource request, and denying
requests originating from websites other than that from which
the resource request originates.
5https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/old/docs/customization
There are many examples of publicly available scripts,
written in a variety of scripting languages, that can be used to
detect hotlinking and block the object from being displayed.
Some allow a warning message or a different message to be
displayed if hotlinking is detected.
C. Input Restriction
We have tested a range of publicly available bots that solve
certain types of CAPTCHA, including DeCaptcher6. When the
CAPTCHA requires the user to type something, the bots we
tested paste the entire solution to the CAPTCHA puzzle into
the web form. By contrast, a user is unlikely to have any reason
to paste the solution since they are inputting the solution to
a varying CAPTCHA puzzle. A script can be used to disable
the pasting of values and, as a result, restrict input to typing
only.
In order to reduce any impact on usability, we recommend
that pasting is only disabled for CAPTCHA puzzle solutions
and not for form inputs, since some users might be using their
browser’s autofill feature or might choose to paste, rather than
type, certain values such as email addresses, phone numbers,
etc. Of course global disabling of pasting has some advantages,
since it will help stop some bots, or at least slow them down,
as all field values will need to be typed one character at a
time. Ultimately, this is a usability issue and website owners
must decide whether to disable pasting of values for the entire
web form or just for the CAPTCHA puzzles, depending on
the nature of the page and their own risk assessments.
D. Device Fingerprinting
Device fingerprinting techniques, as discussed for exam-
ple by Eckersley [5], are extremely effective in uniquely
identifying a single client. They typically involve a website
downloading JavaScript which interrogates the browser to
learn, for example, which fonts are enabled. The combination
of information available to the script is, apparently, sufficient
to uniquely identify a client platform with high probability,
independently of the IP address. Indeed, the technique is so
effective that there are a number of commercial providers of
device fingerprinting services7. A bot will typically operate
from a single server, or a small number of servers, and so if
device fingerprinting reveals a significant number of requests
all originating from the same device then this could be a strong
indication of a bot. That is, fingerprinting could be used to
blacklist potential bot hosts, analogously to IP blacklisting.
E. Switching between CAPTCHAs
Typically, bots are programmed to attack specific
CAPTCHAs [10]. This safeguard works by switching between
multiple CAPTCHA types. For example, if a website uses
reCAPTCHA and a bot is programmed to defeat it, then the
website would be virtually defenceless against that bot. How-
ever, if the website switches between different CAPTCHAs,
then the website would be vulnerable to that bot only when
an instance of reCAPTCHA is used. This would significantly
reduce the number of successful attacks by such CAPTCHA-
specific bots.
6https://de-captcher.com
7see for example https://www.cybersource.com/
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Implementation would typically involve automatically
switching between CAPTCHAs from a range of CAPTCHA
providers. However, using in-house CAPTCHAs is also pos-
sible, as long as there is a significant difference between one
CAPTCHA and another. The strength of such a safeguard is
clearly dependent on a variety of factors including: the strength
of CAPTCHAs deployed, the total number of CAPTCHA types
deployed and the frequency of switching. Moreover, the effect
on usability will vary depending on the selected CAPTCHAs.
VII. SAFEGUARD EFFECTIVENESS
We next provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 12
safeguards introduced in the previous two sections. We start by
discussing the criteria for performing the evaluation, and then
examine each safeguard in turn. A summary table is provided
in section VII-C.
A. Evaluation Criteria
In order to understand the effectiveness of safeguards we
first need to decide how to perform the evaluation. We have
chosen to use the following four evaluation criteria, for the
reasons specified.
• Protection offered: In section we identified three
general classes of attack against CAPTCHAs. Some
safeguards only help protect against certain classes of
attack, and so for each technique we evaluate which
of the three main attack types it can help mitigate.
• Implementation possibilities: Since such an approach
is widely used, we need to consider the possibility
that the CAPTCHAs are provided by a third party,
independent of the website the CAPTCHAs are being
used to protect. All the safeguards we discuss can
be implemented with the support of the CAPTCHA
provider, but only some of them can be deployed
by a website independently of the provider. Clearly,
allowing the latter is potentially advantageous in prac-
tice since website owners will be able to improve
CAPTCHA security for themselves, instead of de-
pending solely on CAPTCHA providers. Also, there
are inherent advantages in site-specific implementa-
tions of attack mitigations, since “off the shelf” bots
may be ineffective against them.
• Effect on usability: Some safeguards might, in some
circumstances, negatively affect the user experience,
albeit in a minor way. Others operate in such a way
that they are most unlikely to have any effect on the
user experience.
• Simplicity of implementation: All safeguards require
the server to validate the interaction in some way. In
some cases, the validation process can be implemented
easily, e.g. by adding simple HTML or CSS code.
Others may be a little more complex to implement, e.g.
requiring the use of client-side scripting. Yet others
may require quite complex functionality, e.g. involving
server-side scripting/programming. This criterion mea-
sures the expected difficulty of implementing a safe-
guard by a website owner. In practice, the difficulty
of implementation will vary depending on the system
being protected and the detailed approach selected to
implement the safeguard.
B. Evaluation
We next use the criteria proposed immediately above
to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the safeguards. We
consider the 12 safeguards in the order in which they were
introduced in sections V and VI.
• IP Blacklisting: This safeguard could be used to help
protect against all three types of CAPTCHA attacks,
as it aims at blocking any IP address that generates
suspiciously large volumes of traffic to a website.
This is ideally implemented by a website owner as
it would specifically target attackers of their website.
Unfortunately, this safeguard carries with it the risk
of blocking legitimate users who happen to share a
public IP address with an attacker, are using a proxy
server, or who are using a compromised machine.
An IP blacklisting service is available from many web
hosting providers8. However, if this option is not avail-
able from a hosting provider or no hosting provider is
involved, then this safeguard is relatively complex to
implement. This is because its implementation would
require a means of monitoring the source IP addresses
of visits to a website as well as providing server-side
code to block particularly active IP addresses (e.g. by
configuring the Linux native firewall, iptables).
• Site Keys: This safeguard prevents a CAPTCHA
from being displayed on a website other than the
one intended, thereby mitigating human exploitation
attacks. This safeguard can only be implemented by
a CAPTCHA provider, as it requires the generation
of a key that is held by both the website and the
CAPTCHA provider. This safeguard is unlikely to
affect legitimate users of a website in any way, as it is
designed only to prevent the display of a CAPTCHA
on an unauthorised website. Once a key is provided to
the website owner, implementing it may be as simple
as adding a few lines of code9.
• Decoy Fields: This safeguard helps protect against
bots that attempt to automatically fill form fields
and submit CAPTCHA puzzle solutions. It can be
implemented by the website owner, independently of
the CAPTCHA provider, by adding a decoy field to
its online form and rejecting any submission that has
this field filled in. Since the decoy field is invisible, it
is unlikely that, in practice, a user would be affected
by it. However, if the user is employing an autofill
program, and this program entered values in the de-
coy field just like a bot, a false alarm could result,
although such an event seems unlikely. Implementing
this safeguard simply requires the addition of an extra
field in a form using HTML, and using CSS to hide
it10.
8See for example, HostGator or GoDaddy
9This is described on the help page:
https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/display
10This was demonstrated by the blogger who first proposed this approach
– see: http://haacked.com/archive/2007/09/11/honeypot-captcha.aspx/
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• Response Time Monitoring: This safeguard pro-
tects against bots which complete forms or solve
CAPTCHAs significantly faster than humans would.
Accordingly, it defends against CAPTCHA-solving
attacks. It can be implemented by the CAPTCHA
provider if monitoring is restricted to the time needed
to solve the puzzle. Alternatively, if the safeguard is
implemented by the website owner, e.g. in the form
of JavaScript downloaded to the browser, it could
monitor the time required to complete a form and
solve the CAPTCHA. Just like the previous safeguard,
a user might be negatively affected if using an autofill
program, as it might complete a form faster than a
user would. One of the ways this safeguard can be
implemented is through the use of client-side scripting
to calculate the time elapsed from the moment input is
detected. The rate of CAPTCHA/form completion can
be calculated from the differences between timestamps
of monitored events.
• Framing Prevention: This safeguard prevents users
from interacting with a website that is embedded
within another. This will prevent users from being
tricked into solving CAPTCHAs of websites other
than they are visiting. It can be implemented indepen-
dently from CAPTCHA providers as it involves con-
figuring HTTP headers on the website owner server
side. This safeguard is not expected to have any impact
on legitimate users. Framing prevention is simple to
implement, e.g. by the addition of a few lines of code
to the server’s configuration file.
• Interaction Detection: This safeguard detects the pres-
ence of human-like interactions, such as pointer move-
ments and keystrokes. It therefore protects against bots
attempting to solve CAPTCHAs but that are not pro-
grammed to mimic typical user interactions. A website
owner could deploy such a safeguard independently
of the CAPTCHA provider. It is unlikely to affect
users whether they are using a mouse/touchpad or
solely depending on a keyboard for interacting with
the website, as any type of human activity can be
made to trigger one of the interaction events and so
be deemed as indicative of a legitimate user. This
could, for example, be implemented using JavaScript
Events11, in which case a CAPTCHA solution would
only be accepted if one of these events is triggered.
• Pointer Movement Accuracy: This safeguard helps a
server distinguish between a user and bot. A web-
site owner can implement it independently of the
CAPTCHA provider as it involves triggers similar to
those described under Interaction Detection. However,
in this case they are used to measure the accuracy
of movements rather than their presence. If a form
or a CAPTCHA cannot be completed without the
use of mouse movements, then this safeguard will
successfully detect a bot if its mouse movements
are too precise. However, depending on the accuracy
of the detection system, it might also cause a false
11see http://www.w3schools.com/js/js events.asp
positive. This safeguard could be implemented using
inputs from the JavaScript onmouseover feature that
could be implemented at various locations on a web
page or in the CAPTCHA itself. Nevertheless, it would
probably be quite complex to program the number and
location of triggering events necessary to accurately
identify a bot.
• Brand Customization: This safeguard will alert unsus-
pecting users that they are being fooled into solving a
CAPTCHA puzzle of another website. This safeguard
can only be implemented if the CAPTCHA provider
provides a customization option to the website owner.
The addition of a web logo, and perhaps a small
amount of warning text, is unlikely to have a signif-
icant adverse effect on users. Since this is dependent
on the CAPTCHA provider, implementing it would
not typically require a website owner to do any more
than take a few simple steps to display the customized
CAPTCHA.
• Hotlink Prevention: This safeguard helps protect
against human exploitation attacks, as it helps prevent
a CAPTCHA from being redisplayed on a different
website. If a CAPTCHA provider requires files (e.g.
JavaScript files) to be stored on the client server, then
this safeguard can be implemented independently of
the CAPTCHA provider. Just like Site Keys, this aims
solely at preventing the display of a CAPTCHA on
a website other than that for which it was intended,
and so is unlikely to affect the user experience in any
way. As previously described, this safeguard can be
implemented very simply by configuring the .htaccess
files on the web server.
• Input Restriction: This safeguard helps protect against
CAPTCHA-solving bots by preventing pasting of a
CAPTCHA solution or even pasting of values into
fields in an online form. Depending on the type
of CAPTCHA, this could be implemented by the
CAPTCHA provider or the website owner. The web-
site owner can implement it anywhere in the page
that contains the CAPTCHA, while the CAPTCHA
provider can incorporate it in the CAPTCHA itself as
long as it has a field that requires typing of values.
It might affect usability if pasting is disabled for
the whole page as some users might want to utilise
pasting, e.g. as part of autofill. However, if pasting is
disabled only for the solution to a CAPTCHA, then a
user would not typically be affected by it as there is
no obvious reason to paste the solution to the puzzle.
This safeguard could be implemented in a variety of
ways, e.g. by using JavaScript code that only allows
the input of one character at a time in a given field.
• Device Fingerprinting: This safeguard serves the same
purpose as IP blacklisting. Nevertheless, it has the
advantage of identifying specific devices regardless of
whether they use changing IP addresses or they share
IP addresses with other benign devices. However, it is
rather more complicated to implement as it requires
the identification of device fingerprints by collecting
a range of information about the client platform,
typically including the OS and web browser. Device
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TABLE I. CAPTCHA SAFEGUARDS COMPARISON
Criteria / CAPTCHA Protects Against? Implementable ByWebsite owner? Might Affect Usability? Simplicity
IP Blacklisting All Attacks Yes Yes Complex
Site Keys Human exploitation No No Simple
Decoy Fields CAPTCHA-solving Yes Yes Simple
Response Time Monitoring CAPTCHA-solving Yes Yes Moderate
Framing Prevention Human exploitation Yes No Simple
Interaction Detection CAPTCHA-solving Yes No Moderate
Pointer Movement Accuracy CAPTCHA-solving Yes Yes Complex
Brand Customization Human exploitation No No Simple
Hotlink Prevention Human exploitation Might No Simple
Input Restriction CAPTCHA-solving Yes Yes Moderate
Device Fingerprinting All Attacks Yes Yes Complex
Switching between CAPTCHAs CAPTCHA-solving Yes Yes Complex
fingerprinting can be implemented by the website
owner or outsourced to a device fingerprinting service
provider. This safeguard aims at blocking interactions
with suspicious web clients or at least prompting the
use of extra, perhaps even more complex, CAPTCHA
puzzles. Legitimate users might be affected if they
were mistakenly identified as bots and as a result
blocked from interacting with the website or chal-
lenged with more CAPTCHA puzzles.
• Switching between CAPTCHAs: This safeguard re-
duces the success chances of bots programmed to
solve specific CAPTCHAs. It can only be imple-
mented by a website owner, as it would typically
involve deploying CAPTCHAs from a range of
providers. It might affect usability as the user expe-
rience would vary depending on the difficulty of the
CAPTCHA presented. Implementing this safeguard is
expected to be quite complex, as it would require pro-
gramming a website to automatically switch between
CAPTCHAs as well as deal with different types of
response depending on the CAPTCHA provider.
Large scale practical trials are required to complete the
comparison of the performance and effectiveness of the safe-
guards discussed in this paper. Trials of specific safeguards are
planned as future work (see section VIII).
C. Summary of Evaluation
The results of our evaluation are summarised in Table I.
Column 2 of the table indicates which attack (as discussed
in section VII-A) is mitigated by a given safeguard. Column
3 indicates whether or not a safeguard can be independently
implemented by a website owner. Column 4 indicates whether
or not a safeguard could have an effect on usability. In column
5 the simplicity of implementing a safeguard is summarised as
one of: HTML (simple), client-side scripting (moderate) and
server-side scripting/programming (complex).
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Given their growing ubiquity, additional safeguards could
usefully be developed to take advantage of particular properties
of touchscreen devices such as smartphones. For example,
very accurate touches could be deemed suspicious, and may
possibly be indicative of a bot interaction. Another possibility
would be to request users to stroke their fingers across certain
paths or points. This is a similar approach to Android’s pattern
phone lock security, but in this case it would be used by
a website to prove human interaction. Additionally, sensors
commonly found in modern smartphones such as motion
sensors, gyroscope, etc. could be utilised as evidence of human
interaction.
Ultimately, an invisible CAPTCHA would be ideal, as
it would be hidden from users and not require any specific
actions by them; hence it would not create any usability issues
that might frustrate users. Such a CAPTCHA would ideally
work in the background, and use information derived from
normal human interactions with the website to confirm they are
human. It therefore seems reasonable to focus future research
efforts on developing such non-intrusive human/computer dis-
tinguishers.
The more difficult CAPTCHA-solving becomes for bots,
the more attackers are likely to move towards the use of
human CAPTCHA solvers. We believe that one of the biggest
challenges in the future will be to stop humans doing the dirty
work on behalf of bots. Addressing this will require designing
CAPTCHAs that not only differentiate between human users
and computers, but that also have the ability to differentiate
between genuine and non-genuine users.
IX. CONCLUSION
In general, layering is better than depending on a single
layer of protection (the defence in depth principle). This is
why depending on a CAPTCHA puzzle alone as the sole
means of filtering out bot interactions is not necessarily the
most effective approach. A bot is programmed to successfully
attack a specific type of CAPTCHA and, as a result, a
website that uses such a CAPTCHA as its sole defence will
immediately be vulnerable to attacks by this bot. Since past
experience suggests that the development of a CAPTCHA-
defeating technique is always possible (or even likely), sup-
plementary safeguards such as those discussed in this paper
are a vitally important weapon in the fight against bots.
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